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T R O T T E R  R E V I E W 
 
Community Land Trusts: 
A Powerful Vehicle 
For Development without Displacement 
May Louie 
I was taking care of my mother and my daughter.  Some people call us 
the sandwich generation.  I call us the mammogram generation—
we’re squeezed.  I was really scared.  I knew when they took away 
rent control, everything would go berserk...When they took away rent 
control and he doubled the rent and then not that much later, raised it 
again, I was so afraid. I took a homebuyer class... A girl at my 
job…gave me a flyer.  They’re building ten new homes by lottery. I 
got a notice.  I got number 10!  A lot of things were falling apart in my 
life.  But God was watching out for me...I’m paying less now in my 
fixed mortgage than I paid in rent before I moved here in 1998…I 
know I can afford to stay where I am today, and that’s huge. 
Diane Dujon, homeowner 
Dudley Neighbors Inc. 
(Author Interview, 2007) 
 
In the Great Recession of 2007–2009, Boston’s communities of color were 
hit hard.  A 2009 map of foreclosures looked like a map of the communities of 
color—Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan.  The one island of stability was a 
section of Roxbury called the Dudley Triangle—home to the community land trust 
of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI).   
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Originally established to respond to the community’s vision of 
“development without displacement,” the land trust model was adopted to help 
residents gain control of land and to use that control to prevent families from being 
priced out as they organized to improve their neighborhood.  They were successful.  
Today, DSNI’s community land trust—called Dudley Neighbors, Inc. (DNI)—
accommodates 225 units of permanently affordable housing, commercial and 
nonprofit space, a park/playground, a mini-orchard and garden, a 1.5-acre urban 
farm, and a community greenhouse. The land trust has proven to be  crucial in the 
community’s progress, an anchor for the continuing neighborhood investment 
toward its vision of an urban village and in preventing displacement in a hot real 
estate market.  
DNI’s recent performance in the face of the collapse of housing markets was 
just as stunning and less anticipated.  Protective features of the land trust mean that 
there have been no subprime mortgages, and therefore no foreclosures due to 
predatory loans. Other features allowed the land trust to work with homeowners to 
prevent foreclosure on conventional mortgages.  
DSNI’s land trust benefits low- to moderate-income families and the broader 
neighborhood. By safeguarding families in their homes, DNI stabilizes the 
community as a whole. 
What Is a Community Land Trust and How Does One Work? 
Community Land Trusts (CLTs) come out of a tradition that is deeply rooted 
in movements for social justice and fairness, along with a tradition of transforming 
the relationship among the individual, the land, and the community. The first CLT 
in the United States was not urban but a rural agricultural land trust, New 
Communities, established in Georgia in 1968. It was formed at a time when Black 
farmers in the South were being forced off the land by mechanization and 
economic retaliation for registering to vote (Davis, 2010, 15). Charles Sherrod, 
director of New Communities, recalls the obstacles he met as a young SNCC 
(Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) organizer: 
…the thing that prompted me to think in terms of self-sustaining capacity 
more than anything else was knocking on doors all over the country— whether it 
was in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, or in Virginia…I was hearing people say 
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the same thing time and time again. “What you going to do if I’m kicked out of my 
house? You young people are talking a good talk – this is a good thing you’re 
doing—but I live on this man’s land, and what am I going to do if they take my 
job, take my house?”... 
…So years of that…The only solution that one could come to would be that 
we have to own land ourselves.” (Davis, 2010, 195) 
DSNI’s land trust comes out of this same tradition – a devastated urban 
community of color searching for vehicles that would allow it to take control of its 
own destiny and safeguard its future. The trust is part of a comprehensive 
community-controlled strategy. DNI was created by DSNI out of the community’s 
mandate for “development without displacement” and its trailblazing campaign for 
land control. 
Today, in the United States, the CLT model is primarily used to protect 
housing affordability. Land trust housing is one model of what the late Dr. Michael 
Stone, community planning and urban policy professor and housing advocate, and 
others call social ownership of housing and land that is not owned or operated for 
profit, cannot be sold for speculative gain, and  provides security of tenure (Stone 
in Bratt, Stone, and Hartman, 2006).   
Each of the CLTs in the country has developed out of the vision of its 
particular community and its circumstances.  Each of them has followed a different 
path. There has been diversity in how they acquired land, generally through public 
and private donations or public subsidies to make purchases.  What they have in 
common is their social commitment—as mentioned above, to preventing 
displacement of residents (often very low-income residents) due to gentrification.  
Early proponents developed what became known as a “classic” CLT model. 
Today, there are many variations as communities mold this flexible tool to serve 
their own goals. Here are some general features common to most land trusts. 
A CLT is typically a community-based, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation 
set up for charitable purposes. Distinguishing characteristics are: 
Dual ownership: Ownership is divided between two entities: the trust retains 
ownership of the land, stewarding its use on behalf of the community; the 
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structures are owned by families, cooperative associations, nonprofit developers, 
etc. 
Leased land: The trust provides exclusive use of the land to the owners of 
the structures through a long-term ground lease. 
Perpetual affordability:  Through ground lease restrictions, the land trust 
caps the resale price of homes and requires that they be sold to income- eligible 
buyers; in this way, the subsidies used to make the original price of the home 
affordable to low- and moderate-income families are retained in the home, 
allowing it to be affordable to generation after generation of buyers.   
Perpetual responsibility: As community place-based organizations, CLTs are 
committed to a community agenda and stay in the picture after purchase through 
successive owners.  They have a stake in and work for homeowner success. (Davis 
and Jacobus, 2008) 
These characteristics have allowed CLT communities to retain a stock of 
affordable homes and, in this way, serve as a hedge against gentrification. In the 
case of Dudley Neighbors, it signs a 99-year (renewable and inheritable) extended- 
period ground lease allowing the family to use the land. The lease includes an 
article on the “Transfer, Sale or Disposition of Improvements,” placing two 
restrictions on resale:  the home must be sold to a low- or moderate-income person; 
and the home must be sold within the price limits outlined in the lease.  The resale 
formula allows for a modest appreciation for each year of ownership, plus 100 
percent of any improvements.  In addition, the ground lease requires that the home 
serve as the owner’s primary residence (DNI, n.d.).  In other words, it cannot be an 
investment or speculative property. These provisions protect affordability in 
perpetuity. 
Homeowners receive many of the benefits of traditional market ownership.   
They are able to build equity through their initial down payment, their payments 
against their mortgage principal, and investments in improvements, as well as a 




How did DNI (and other CLTs) prove to be protective at the other end of the 
housing cycle—during the real estate crash?  
Dudley Neighbors (and CLTs generally) provides protections that are 
missing in conventional market housing or in a more commonly used model of 
affordable housing with deed restrictions. The ground lease limits owners to taking 
“Permitted Mortgage(s) Only.” Mortgage and home equity loans must be approved 
by the CLT. This provides a layer of protection against predatory lenders. In 
addition, the CLT has an “early warning system.” DNI is notified by the lender if 
the homeowner defaults on mortgage payments.  The land trust has a total of 120 
days to take action.  The homeowner can cure at any time before foreclosure.  The 
land trust also has the option to cure or to assume the mortgage.  If neither the 
homeowner nor DNI takes action, then the lender forecloses, and the home loses its 
affordability restrictions and can be sold at market price. (DNI, n.d.) 
The Guiding Principle behind CLTs 
Practitioner-scholar and community land trust expert John Emmeus Davis 
has promoted the use of the term “shared equity” homeownership to describe a 
subset of socially owned housing: community land trusts, limited-equity 
cooperatives, and deed-restricted homes.  Why is equity shared?  Equity is created 
by more than one party and therefore shared.  The homeowner creates equity 
through his/her purchase and improvement of the home.  The public, the 
community, also invests, through a subsidy of some kind (a public or foundation 
grant, an extraction from a for-profit developer, or a government program to 
reduce mortgage rates or provide a “soft second” mortgage) – in order to make the 
home available to a low- to moderate-income purchaser.  Often, there is also public 
investment in infrastructure and amenities, private investment in improving other 
properties, and community investment to address quality-of-life issues. Also, 
market forces may increase the appraised value of the home.   
In market rate housing, all of the socially created equity belongs to the 
homeowner and is realized in the appreciation of his/her home.  The converse is 
also true. In the private market, the consequences of disinvestment and market 
depreciation (and market crashes) fall totally on the individual owner. All of the 
risk and all of the benefit fall on the individual. 
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In shared equity housing, this situation does not occur.  The homeowner 
generally recoups his/her investment plus some equity at resale, with the price 
remaining affordable to the next (and future) buyers.  “Market-rate housing tilts 
heavily toward the individual...Shared equity housing is designed to correct this 
imbalance, bringing the interests of individuals into closer alignment with the 
interests of community” (Davis, 2006, 3). 
The community land trust model embodies a commitment to the principle 
that a community has an interest in the way that its land base is used and in the 
way that its land is allocated to individual members of the community. The CLT 
directly expresses and acts upon this principle when it enters into a ground lease as 
steward of the community’s land and guardian of the community’s interests. 
Through the ground lease the community’s interests are affirmatively stated and 
are balanced with the stated interests of the individual. (Abromowitz and White, 
2006, 333) 
From Devastation to Urban Village-in-Progress 
How was the Dudley area, a once devastated neighborhood, able to gain 
control of land and protect families from the powerful market forces that, on the 
one hand, raise housing prices way beyond the reach of low- to moderate-income 
families, and, on the other, triggered a major global financial crisis? 
The book Streets of Hope chronicles DSNI’s remarkable first ten years. 
From the 1950s to the 1980s, Roxbury and North Dorchester, the heart of Boston’s 
African American community, suffered the consequences of the discriminatory 
home mortgage insurance policies of the Federal Housing Administration (creating 
white suburbs), the redlining of urban neighborhoods by financial institutions and 
insurance companies, and the practices of unscrupulous real estate brokers.  These 
all combined to create white flight, plummeting real estate values, deteriorating 
housing stock, and a population of color shut off from the services and 
opportunities of the city and region.  Moreover, until 1983, an inequitable property 
tax system charged a significantly higher effective rate for poorer areas (Medoff 
and Sklar, 1994, 30). 
While the Dudley neighborhood (part of Roxbury and part of North 
Dorchester) was not the only area in Boston to be hard hit, the impact in Dudley 
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was severe.  As absentee owners sought to minimize their losses and recapture part 
of their investment in depreciating properties, arson fires raged through the 
neighborhood, night after night, during the 1970s and into the 1980s.  Rubble-filled 
vacant lots soon became the regional dumping ground.  Burned and trashed, 
Dudley became a virtual wasteland.  Thirty percent of Dudley’s land lay vacant. 
The level of destruction was compared to bombed-out Beirut.  
Over the years, residents and agencies made multiple attempts to organize 
stakeholders, to develop studies and plans, to engage city officials, and to create 
partnerships and the infrastructure to halt the destruction and to revitalize the 
neighborhood. They made little progress.  
Then, in 1984, the trustees of the Mabel Louise Riley Foundation visited a 
local nonprofit agency, La Alianza Hispana, in response to a funding request.  
They were shocked by the conditions they found less than two miles from their 
downtown offices. The Riley Foundation worked with local agencies to focus 
significant time and resources on making a difference in Dudley.  Thus, the Dudley 
Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) was formed.  Early intervention by local 
residents resulted in a resident-led collaboration rather than the originally proposed 
agency-dominated structure. DSNI was established to fulfill the functions of 
community planners and organizers—rather than the more familiar roles of 
community developers or human service providers (Medoff and Sklar).  In this 
way, it provided the Dudley neighborhood with the capacity to convene, to vision, 
to identify strategies and tools, to develop plans, and to engage in community 
building activities that would grow Dudley’s collective power. 
DSNI was formed during a period of political change in Boston. With the 
end of the sixteen-year mayoralty of Kevin White, Boston had just elected a new 
mayor.  Ray Flynn, a son of South Boston, became mayor by defeating the Boston 
Rainbow Coalition’s Mel King, the first African-American to appear on a mayoral 
general-election ballot in the city.  King swept the vote in the Black community, 
and won Latino and Asian votes, too.  The new city administration faced militant 
organizing against unequal conditions in the Black community. The Greater 
Roxbury Incorporation Project (GRIP) sought to have Greater Roxbury secede 
from the city and incorporate as a separate municipality named “Mandela.”  
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Anxious to win allies in communities of color, the Flynn administration 
established a new relationship with the Dudley neighborhood. In 1986, as DSNI 
was about to launch a comprehensive community-planning process, it was able to 
reach an agreement with the city’s Public Facilities Department to declare a 
moratorium on changing the disposition of city-owned vacant land in the Dudley 
area.  This was an important step in restraining market forces and speculative land 
acquisitions.  In 1987, two lots on Dudley Street sold for over $20 a square foot, 
compared to $2–$3 a square foot a couple of years earlier (Medoff and Sklar, 
1994). 
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative Revitalization Plan: A 
Comprehensive Community Controlled Strategy, completed in 1987, was the result 
of nine months of intense community engagement.   The strategy envisioned an 
urban village.  Among its major goals was “development without displacement,” 
with quality affordable housing and neighborhood control.  DSNI was successful 
in getting the city to adopt this community-generated plan as its own (Medoff and 
Sklar, 1994). 
“Take a Stand, Own the Land” 
The formation of the Dudley Neighbors, Inc., CLT was the result of the 
convergence of conditions, community goals, and opportunities.  Streets of Hope 
describes those conditions, the community’s dilemma, and the subsequent 
organizing campaign.  In a 64-acre area in the center of the community, the Dudley 
Triangle, almost half of the land—30 acres—lay vacant and filled with garbage.  
About 15 acres were abandoned by their private owners and taken by the city over 
time for tax arrears.  The other 15 acres were composed of 181 parcels owned by 
131 different individuals. More than 60 percent of the owners lived outside the 
neighborhood. The public and private land formed a checkerboard pattern, making 
it impossible to assemble a critical mass for redevelopment even if the city had 
made all its land available.  Foreclosing on the delinquent private parcels one by 
one would be a complex and drawn-out process.  As DSNI considered the use of 
eminent domain as a means to gain control of the private land, it assumed that it 
would be organizing to pressure the city to use its power on behalf of the 
neighborhood.  DSNI’s pro bono attorneys at Rackemann, Sawyer and Brewster, 
however, prepared a memo that concluded, “Two entities may acquire property in 
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Boston by eminent domain for the purpose of developing low and moderate 
income housing: the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and an urban 
redevelopment corporation authorized by the BRA to undertake a Chapter 121A 
project” (Medoff and Sklar, 118). 
A Chapter 121A “project” is defined as “any undertaking consisting of the 
construction in a blighted open, decadent or substandard area of decent, safe and 
sanitary residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational or 
governmental buildings and such appurtenant or incidental facilities as shall be in 
the public interest...” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 119) 
Even as DSNI wrestled with the issue within the community, BRA director 
Stephen Coyle independently suggested that DSNI form a separate corporation and 
apply to the BRA for eminent domain authority under 121A! 
DSNI conducted an organizing campaign in the community and at City Hall: 
Take a Stand, Own the Land. Step by step, DSNI engaged with neighborhood 
stakeholders, conducting a “road show” to elicit feedback and listen to concerns. It 
engaged with local landowners so that they would be part of the process to 
determine the disposition of their land, thus distinguishing them from absentee 
landowners. 
Winning support from the city required DSNI to overcome many obstacles. 
One was the deep-rooted skepticism toward a low-income community of color’s 
ability to skillfully wield the power of eminent domain and to engage in the 
complex task of neighborhood revitalization.  The large size of the acreage over 
which DSNI was seeking control was also unprecedented.  
With Coyle’s support as head of the city’s planning agency, DSNI sought 
the support of Lisa Chapnick, head of the Public Facilities Department, which was 
the city’s development agency. DSNI made three main arguments to her: The grant 
of eminent domain authority (1) would help control speculation and gentrification, 
and prevent displacement; (2) would lead to more significant change than scattered 
site development on city parcels; and (3) if control of the private land was key for 
both of these goals, any attempt by the BRA or city to exercise eminent domain 
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would result in fierce community opposition because of the city’s eminent domain 
history.1  
DSNI’s arguments prevailed. Chapnick signed on. She explained: “DSNI 
was asking the city to delegate its role to a large extent—its financial role, its 
property role, its legal role…Because it was your neighborhood and you could not, 
in fact, be in charge of your own destiny? And ultimately, the answer was, yes— 
that government had failed.”  (Medoff and Sklar, 125) 
DSNI’s eminent domain application had strong supporters and staunch 
opponents within city government, including the opposition of the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority Board. Ultimately, it was Mayor Flynn’s strong-armed 
backing that prevailed.  
It was clear to me that there was only one place the city government should 
be, and that’s on their side—not creating barriers for them not to be able to do 
something, but giving them the power so they could do something for 
themselves… 
Eminent domain “was a risk…because…if it didn’t meet with a level of 
success, it would have been me as the mayor being held responsible for yet another 
misguided social policy…The question obviously I had to resolve on behalf of the 
entire city of Boston and its fiduciary interests: Were these people able to make it 
happen?” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 130) 
DSNI did indeed “make it happen.” DSNI formed Dudley Neighbors, Inc. 
(DNI), in August of 1988 to serve as the urban redevelopment corporation required 
under Chapter 121A.  DNI was established as a community land trust to acquire, 
own, and steward land on behalf of the community.  A unique set of 
circumstances— a severely physically devastated area, the particular configuration 
of public and private land, the confluence of political circumstances, and city 
officials willing to take risks—came together in the unprecedented granting of 
eminent domain to a community nonprofit.  DNI has that authority over vacant 
                                                          
1 The city had used eminent domain to raze the working class West End neighborhood to make way for Government Center and 
luxury housing downtown. Similarly, “urban renewal of  blighted” areas was used as the excuse to gentrify the South End and to 
tear down low-rent dwellings in Washington Park and many other parts of the communities of color. Eminent domain was used 
to make way for the proposed Southwest Corridor Expressway, destroying homes, businesses, and communities. Although 
significant organized protest eventually stopped the construction of the highway, it left a swath of vacant land that divided 
Roxbury from the rest of Boston, land that is only now being fully developed. 
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land in the Dudley Triangle (not over structures and not in the entire Dudley 
footprint). 
Both of these strategies—organizing to have the city convey eminent 
authority to the community and the creation of a community land trust—were 
gutsy, innovative moves by a gutsy, innovative community organization. The 
conveyance of eminent domain to a community was unprecedented and remains 
unreplicated anywhere else in the country. At the time, the community land trust 
model was still relatively new and largely untested in an urban setting. The 
community’s desire to control land to protect against urban renewal and market 
speculation was clear.  CLT proponents from the Institute for Community 
Economics were traveling around the country to introduce and advocate for the 
land trust model and met with DSNI staff and activists.  In his essay “Origins and 
Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States,” John Emmeus 
Davis calls DNI “one of the most significant CLT start-ups during this period” 
(late 1980s to early 1990s), noting its dual commitment to community 
empowerment and community development (Davis, 2010, 26). 
DNI acquired land in two ways.  After the granting of eminent domain 
authority, a Joint Disposition Committee was set up with equal numbers of city and 
DSNI representatives to determine the use of public land and land purchased 
through DSNI’s eminent domain takings.  The city sold its parcels to DNI for $1.  
DSNI/DNI secured a $2 million Ford Foundation loan to purchase private land.  
The Massachusetts economic slump in the early 1990s brought down land prices 
and allowed DNI to purchase the land and repay the loan on schedule (Medoff and 
Sklar, 1994). Today, there are 32 acres of land in the DNI land trust. All but a 
handful of scattered parcels have “permanent improvements”—the end uses that 
the community wanted for that land. As stated earlier, the land trust is home to 225 
units of permanently affordable housing, a park/playground, an urban farm, 
commercial and nonprofit space, a community greenhouse, and a mini orchard and 
garden (author presentation, 2014). Systematically, over almost three decades, 
DSNI and DNI put together the community engagement processes, the 
partnerships, and resources to pursue the community’s vision —through periods of 




DNI Addresses Housing Affordability and Community Building 
Over its three decades, DSNI has forged a partnership with the City of 
Boston to meet shared goals. Homes (on the land trust and on city land in the larger 
Dudley neighborhood) have been planned in partnership with the city.  DSNI and 
the city’s Department of Neighborhood Development jointly convene community 
land use and housing design meetings, issue requests for proposals based on those 
meetings, and jointly designate developers.  Through DSNI’s role as community 
planner and convener and DNI’s stewardship of land, residents are fully engaged in 
land use and housing design decisions in a significant portion of the neighborhood.  
The city and state, as well as private donors, provide subsidies assembled 
from numerous sources to bring down the purchase price of homeownership units 
by approximately $50,000 per unit.  This partnership makes homeownership 
available to families who would otherwise not be able to purchase.  The eligibility 
is capped at families with incomes of 80 percent of the area’s median income. 
DSNI/DNI has striven for much deeper affordability, with some homes sold to 
families at 40 percent of the median.  
Today, the 225 units of permanently affordable housing in the land trust 
comprise a mix of housing types: 95 fee-simple homeownership, 77 limited equity 
cooperative units, and 53 rental units (author presentation, 2014). Land trust homes 
account for almost one-fourth of the 1,019 units in the Dudley Triangle (Jennings, 
July 2013) but a much smaller share of the 8,367 housing units (Jennings, April 
2013) in the entire Dudley neighborhood.   
DSNI identifies the following community-building principles as those of the 
community land trust: 
community control over land use, 
development without displacement, 
permanent housing affordability, 
community and family stability, and 
community and family wealth creation. (DSNI presentation, 2007) 
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The land trust model is premised on balancing the risks and benefits for 
families and for the community, the two being in a symbiotic relationship. Each 
invests. Each benefits as the other does better. 
As former DSNI executive director John Barros has said, “Without the land 
trust, the risk is not just to homeowners, but the community. Foreclosure destroys 
communities. With the [land trust], public funds are used more efficiently and 
responsibly. Society gains from the more stable market the community land trust 
provides.”  (Sklar, 2009, 53) 
DSNI and DNI’s Impact in Meeting Community Goals 
In 2000, the Fannie Mae Foundation examined the double-edged sword of, 
on one hand, community development, and, on the other, gentrification  that 
displaces longtime residents. The foundation warned of “the slippery slope from 
the presumed virtues of ‘income mixing’ to the open conflict of gentrification” 
(Wyly, Cooke, Hammel, Holloway, and Hudson, 2000, 2).  Fannie Mae’s study 
“Ten Just Right’ Urban Markets for Affordable Homeownership,” identified big- 
city neighborhoods where capital investment in residential real estate had 
expanded rapidly but where the number of mortgages to low- and moderate-
income (LMI) people was also rising—in other words, places that were improving 
yet affordable. It designated the Dudley Triangle one of these “just right” 
neighborhoods. The authors suggested that of the ten, three (including Dudley) are 
particularly worth learning from because  
community activism and public policy are important forces in the 
neighborhood.   ...Particularly in Boston’s Dudley Street, Chicago’s 
Edgewater, and Oakland’s Fruitvale, the recent expansion of LMI 
ownership grows out of years of organizing and planning...Indeed, if 
there is one theme common to all of these neighborhoods, it is that the 
emergence of affordable homeownership opportunities has defied so 
many collective social decisions that were once seen as natural or 
inevitable processes—suburbanization, the gradual decline of older 
communities, the flight of white and middle-class residents, and 
eventual abandonment.  Neither disinvestment nor reinvestment is 
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natural—they emerge out of specific economic, social, and 
geographical decisions (Wyly et al., 5). 
Further, they make a call for particular policies: 
If policy makers agree on the need for public interventions to maintain 
affordability and equity in a housing market devastated by 
skyrocketing costs... then the current edge of gentrification activity is 
where immediate action holds the greatest promise for long-term 
change....we may be able to guide investment that encourages 
neighborhood revitalization while preserving affordability and 
equity...In these just-right neighborhoods, value-recapture 
mechanisms (e.g., community land trusts and mutual housing 
associations) might allow us to harness a wave of reinvestment to 
benefit urban residents instead of displacing them (Wyly et al., 2). 
More recently, Lee Dwyer, a recent graduate from the master’s degree 
program at MIT’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning, conducted a rare 
quantitative and spatial analysis of the impact of DNI on neighborhood stability 
and housing affordability. He posed these questions:  
How much and in what ways has DSNI’s land trust brought stability to the 
Dudley neighborhood, specifically in regard to foreclosures, vacant lots, owner 
occupancy, and housing affordability? Is it possible to measure the land trust’s 
impact and isolate it from overall changes in the surrounding neighborhood and the 
broader market? (Dwyer, 2015, 9) 
He shares these results in his master’s thesis, “Mapping Impact: An Analysis 
of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative Land Trust”: 
These results offer some support to my hypothesis, based on common 
arguments about the benefits of community land trusts. First, the lower building 
levels on the land trust bolster the primary claim that this model maintains 
affordability… these average values are much closer to the affordability range for 
the average Dudley household. This, along with considerably lower frequencies of 
vacant lots than one would expect to see …also seem to reflect the stated DSNI 
goal of development without displacement. While DSNI is clearly building homes 
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and other structures on the land trust, it is distinct from speculative or investor 
development. In fact, the higher assessed values on the land trust in 2000 and 2005 
might indicate that the option value or exchange value of this land remain high in a 
time of overall real estate appreciation. In other words, if not for the land trust, 
those same parcels might sell at a premium to for-profit developers, who would be 
less likely to build low-income housing on it. 
The results also indicate some support for my hypothesis that the land trust 
model promotes neighborhood stability in the form of lower vacancy and 
foreclosure rates and higher owner-occupancy rates. While foreclosures rates were 
not significantly different in 2000 and 2005 (due to very low numbers overall), 
during the height of the financial crisis, the land trust showed a markedly lower 
rate. Further analysis shows that in 2008 and 2009, the worst years for foreclosure 
in Boston, the control area had 44 and 41 foreclosures respectively, compared to 
zero and one for the land trust. 
Another interesting result is that while building values in the surrounding 
neighborhood apparently spiked during the economic boom and dropped 
drastically as the recession hit, building values on the land trust show a steady, if 
smaller, growth trend. Owner occupancy rates on the land trust were higher as 
well, and grew at a generally faster rate than in the study area. These indications 
seem to paint a picture of a more stable and affordable community, and they 
generally correspond to assessments by housing experts and those familiar with 
DSNI (2015, 57–59). 
In his conclusion, Dwyer says, 
The results of spatial and quantitative analysis support certain 
hypotheses about the DSNI community land trust, while leaving 
others open to debate. They show a marked pattern of lower building 
values on the land trust even during a time of rising home prices, 
reflecting a key goal of DSNI: to maintain housing affordability. 
Lower rates of foreclosure during the recession also indicate that the 
land trust is promoting neighborhood stability and financial security 
for individual homeowners. The ongoing reduction in vacant lots on 
the land trust, while owner occupancy rates have risen, both at a 
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generally faster rate than the surrounding neighborhood, lends support 
to another crucial DSNI goal of “development without displacement.” 
(Dwyer, 2015, 64) 
Although DSNI and DNI were established during a period of extreme 
disinvestment in the Dudley neighborhood, with low land values and little market 
attractiveness, the founders still anticipated the possibility of gentrification and 
displacement. This forward-looking view, steeped in an understanding of the 
history of urban renewal and eminent domain in Boston, led them to seek the land- 
use control and protections of a community land trust model. This example might 
serve other Boston neighborhoods that are not yet gentrifying or are only on the 
edge of gentrification. Fannie Mae Foundation’s study and Dwyer’s research 
indicate the DNI’s effectiveness toward the goals of development without 
displacement, permanent housing affordability, and community and family 
stability. 
The DNI land trust works in close cooperation with its parent DSNI—the 
community’s planner and organizer.  So land use and affordable housing are 
integrated into a larger comprehensive community effort.  An example of using 
land to advance community goals (in addition to affordable housing and 
neighborhood stability) is the use of Dudley land for urban agriculture.  In order to 
contribute to economic activity and access to affordable healthy food, DSNI built a 
10,000-square-foot community greenhouse by reclaiming a contaminated garage 
site that had been abandoned. Its partner, The Food Project, a land- and food-based 
youth development nonprofit, manages the greenhouse and farms 1.5 acres on the 
land trust (as well as other land).    
Although the importance of local food systems is increasingly appreciated, 
implementation is more difficult. An established land trust like DNI can play a role 
in supporting the growth of urban farming in neighboring communities: 
Despite Boston’s recent legalization of commercial farming, the challenge of 
acquiring land remains. According to Glynn Lloyd, co-founder of City Growers, a 
for-profit farming venture in Boston, “There are so many competing uses for 




In a partnership with the nonprofit Urban Farming Institute, the DNI land 
trust will take ownership of and lease urban agriculture land in other parts of 
Roxbury to give farmers long-term access to land (Loh, 2015). 
The Urgent Need to Address the Housing Crisis 
We are in a housing crisis in which more and more people are unable to 
afford decent shelter. (The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
guidelines define housing affordability as housing that costs 30 percent or less of a 
household’s income.) This situation is particularly apparent in Boston, which is 
one of the most expensive cities in the nation, with housing demand outstripping 
supply and costs far outstripping incomes. The Greater Boston Housing Report 
Card 2014–2015 says: 
Our analysis of home prices, rents, and vacancy rates reveals that housing 
prices continue to rise throughout much of Greater Boston, which already has the 
third highest metro-area-wide rents in the country (Bluestone et al., 2015, p. 7). 
Yet despite Greater Boston’s economic recovery, the area’s high cost of 
living—led by housing and health care—has steadily eroded the real standard of 
living for nearly all but the affluent. The share of homeowners who are “cost 
burdened”—spending more than 30 percent of their income on housing— has 
skyrocketed from less than 27 percent in 2000 to more than 38 percent now. Over 
the same time period, the number of cost burdened renters has increased from 39 
percent to more than 50 percent. And more than a quarter of renters are now 
spending more than half their income on rent alone—up from 18 percent in 2000 
(Bluestone et al., 2015, 5). 
The city’s report Housing a Changing City: Boston 2030 states that 
The city of Boston is currently home to an estimated 28,400 
low-income households burdened by their housing costs. These 
households fall into two categories. There are 23,800 households with 
incomes below $50,000 in Boston who pay 50 percent or more of 
their income on rent. In addition, there are 4,600 families with 
children who are paying more than 35 percent of their household 
incomes in rent (Walsh, 2014, 26). 
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Boston’s plan also reveals that only 9 percent of Boston’s rental housing 
stock is affordable to households with incomes up to $50,000 (Walsh, 2014, 27). 
The existing supply of affordable housing—58,000 subsidized units in Boston—is 
at risk (Walsh, 2014, 33).  Affordability restrictions have expiration points. For 
instance, federal Low-income Tax Credit homes are required to remain affordable 
for only 15 years. Units built under Boston’s inclusionary development policy 
maintain affordability for 30 years. Massachusetts’ 13A Housing restrictions last 
40 years, with the more than 1,000 units built in Boston already at the expiration 
point or reaching it within six years (Walsh, 2014, 40). The Community Economic 
Development Assistance Corporation has identified more than 3,000 units at 
elevated risk of conversion to market-rate housing within the next ten years 
(Walsh, 2014, 39). 
Time to Act in Roxbury and Other Communities of Color 
The city’s housing plan lists Roxbury as an area that is “not gentrifying 
significantly,” based on whether higher-income households are occupying an 
increasing share of the housing stock, while the share occupied by lower-income 
households declines (Walsh, 2014, 89).  Dwyer, community nonprofits, housing 
advocates, local weekly newspapers, and others, however, argue that there is a 
significant danger of gentrification in Roxbury and Dorchester. Among other 
things, they point to major development projects in Dudley Square, new stops 
along the Fairmont commuter rail line, and Mayor Martin Walsh’s commitment to 
neighborhood development. 
A Bay State Banner article reports: 
There are few hard statistics to flesh out the existence of gentrification 
in Roxbury. Median sales prices in the neighborhood have been 
driven down by the high number of foreclosure sales, and nobody’s 
tracking displacement of renters. Perhaps the clearest indication of 
change in Roxbury is in the 2010 Census, which counted the white 
population in the historically black neighborhood nearly double the 
population in the 2000 count, growing from 5.5 percent to 9.6 percent. 
While the population in Roxbury grew from 49,795 to 56,827, the 
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black percentage of the population declined from 62 percent to 52 
percent. 
And that was before the neighborhood’s housing market recovered 
from the 2008 real estate market crash. Now, with single family 
homes selling for more than $500,000 and a red-hot rental market, 
there’s a general consensus among civic leaders, real estate 
professionals and affordable housing activists that Roxbury is at the 
very least in the early stages of gentrification. 
That conclusion was bolstered by a study released earlier this year by the 
First National Bank of Cleveland that identified Boston as the fastest-gentrifying 
city in the country and identified three census tract areas in Roxbury as at risk for 
gentrification. 
While the average African American family with a family income between 
$60,000 and $90,000 can afford a home in the $300,000 range, single-family 
homes throughout Roxbury are now selling for $500,000 (Miller, 2015). 
Similarly, in a research brief prepared for DSNI, James Jennings, then a 
Tufts University professor, found a concentration of variables associated with 
gentrification in three Roxbury census tracts, one of which is in the Dudley 
neighborhood (Jennings, 2014) but outside of the land trust area.  This, plus 
Dwyer’s study, argues for the expansion of DNI within the larger Dudley 
neighborhood and for the adoption of the land trust model in greater Roxbury and 
other Boston neighborhoods. 
The Need for Nonmarket Solutions 
We clearly need to do something other than let the market take care of 
things. As Michael Stone argued in A Right to Housing, “Persistent and pervasive 
shelter poverty challenges us to acknowledge the structural flaws in our institutions 
of housing provision and income distribution” (Stone in Bratt et al., 2006, 38).    
Housing expert Allan Mallach argues that “these risks...have brought out 
clearly the need for alternatives to conventional homeownership strategies.  The 
most important alternatives can be found in what some have called third sector 
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housing” (Mallach in Davis, 2006, Preface), i.e., housing that is neither public nor 
private.   
Stone echoes this approach: 
It is important to recognize that adequate and secure income is the 
necessary foundation for the dream of homeownership not to become 
a nightmare.  On the housing side, complementary strategies should 
promote models of community and resident-controlled non-
speculative ownership—such as limited equity cooperatives, 
community land trusts and mutual housing associations—which can 
provide greater security of tenure and affordability than conventional 
homeownership...” (Stone, 2006, 8) 
The crisis in housing affordability, as well as the flexibility and 
opportunities in this approach, call for significant attention to and acceptance of 
third-sector (nonmarket, nonpublic) housing.  To have the needed impact, i.e., to 
truly address the housing crisis, third-sector housing needs to go to scale, with 
significant acceptance and adoption by all levels and sectors—government 
agencies, lenders, philanthropies, nonprofit housing providers, communities, and 
community organizations.  It requires policy and planning as well as financial and 
political support.   
Absent this comprehensive multi-sectoral approach, communities 
themselves can and must continue to do what they have been doing: take action 
that uses these tools to help stabilize their communities and provide some 
protection from gentrification. Roxbury is at that moment in time highlighted in the 
Fannie Mae Foundation study: when proactive measures must be taken before 
market forces tip the community into gentrification and displacement. Boston’s 
Chinatown neighborhood, whose identity as an immigrant working-class 
community is threatened by luxury development, institutional expansion, and 






CLTs’ Extraordinary Characteristics 
 Even among third-sector, nonspeculative housing alternatives, CLTs are a 
particularly attractive and effective vehicle. They embed scarce affordable housing 
resources in the house itself to create permanent affordability. By preserving the 
affordability of existing units, they reduce the need for new construction and new 
subsidies. They provide protection at both ends of the housing cycle. Through their 
stewardship functions, they partner with homeowners to keep them in their homes. 
What the CLT does better than any other organization—its specialized niche 
in a densely populated nonprofit environment—is to preserve affordability when 
economic times are good and protect its homes and homeowners when times are 
bad. In the scorched landscape of the national mortgage crisis, CLTs were almost 
alone in reporting few defaults and even fewer foreclosures. Such stunning 
performance in a time of crisis attracted wider notice and greater governmental 
support for this unconventional model of homeownership. (Davis, 2010, pp. 28–
29) 
In a policy environment in which there are very scarce public resources for 
affordable housing construction, preservation of existing units is crucial. 
Institutionally, CLTs are generally focused in their purpose of preservation 
of long-term, affordable housing.  This focus distinguishes CLTs from the many 
other participants—government agencies, for-profit and nonprofit developers, 
lenders—who tend to be more intent on the initial production of the low income 
housing supply (Abromowitz, 2000, 222). 
Goulston and Storrs real estate attorney David Abromowitz (who coauthored 
the CLT Legal Manual and serves as DNI’s pro bono attorney) concluded that the 
land trust is also a superior legal instrument in preserving housing affordability. 
Compared to deed-restricted homeownership, ground-lease restricted 
homeownership may require more effort by the CLT as sponsoring agency and is 
generally less familiar (and in some cases less acceptable) to homebuyers. 
However, it can also provide a stronger basis for the enforcement of restrictions, a 
better basis for the support of economically vulnerable homeowners, and a more 
complete set of tools for preserving the public’s investment in the home even in 
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situations where a mortgage is foreclosed (Abromowitz and White, 2006, 331–
332). 
The effectiveness of CLTs nationwide has been demonstrated post-
recession.  In her 2011 study, Stable Home Ownership in a Turbulent Economy: 
Delinquencies and Foreclosures Remain Low in Community Land Trusts, Emily 
Thaden found that CLT mortgages outperformed every other type of mortgage. 
She examined mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates among the owner-
occupants of resale-restricted houses and condominiums in community land trusts 
across the United States and compared CLT results to rates of delinquency and 
foreclosure among the owner-occupants of conventional market-rate housing 
reported by the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Association 
(MBA).  
Here are some of the key findings: 
● 1.30 percent of the mortgage loans held by CLT homeowners were 
seriously delinquent (defined as loans at least 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure 
proceedings) at the end of 2010, compared to a delinquency rate of 8.57 percent of 
mortgage loans in the conventional market reported by the MBA. 
● 0.46 percent of the mortgage loans held by CLT homeowners were in 
foreclosure proceedings at the end of 2010, compared to a foreclosure rate of 4.63 
percent reported by the MBA among the owners of market-rate homes. 
 These dramatic results are even more impressive given that CLT loans 
are held by low- to moderate-income households while the MBA sample spans all 
income groups. 
Here are some more results: 
● While the rate of seriously delinquent mortgages reported by the MBA 
increased from the end of 2008 to 2009, with a slight decrease from the end of 
2009 to 2010, serious delinquency rates steadily declined every year between 2008 
and 2010 in mortgages held by CLT homeowners. 
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● While the rate of foreclosure proceedings reported by the MBA climbed 
every year from 2008 to the end of 2010, the foreclosure proceedings rate among 
CLT homeowners declined every year. 
●The annual rate of completed foreclosures during 2010 among CLT 
homeowners was 0.42 percent, far below the foreclosure rate in the conventional 
market. 
The study also explored practices and policies of CLTs that may help to 
explain their better performance. The report concludes:   
While the affordability offered by the CLT model to low- to moderate-
income households who enter home ownership helps to explain the low rates of 
delinquency and foreclosure in CLTs, the stewardship activities and policies of 
CLTs also contribute to these superior outcomes. Many CLTs oversee loan 
acquisition, educate and support their homeowners during both the pre-purchase 
and post-purchase periods, interact and intervene with mortgage lenders, and 
intervene with homeowners at risk of foreclosure (Thaden, 2011, Abstract). 
 




To summarize, the CLT model occupies a special place among community- 
building and affordable housing strategies. Through land acquisition and control, it 
allows a community to plan proactively a healthy sustainable neighborhood with a 
good mix of uses. It can help the community reach a broad range of goals— 
including recreation and open space, urban agriculture and healthy food, affordable 
housing and commercial space. As for housing, it preserves scarce resources so 
that generation after generation of owners can benefit from the initial investment 
that made the home affordable. It protects at both ends of the housing cycle—
against gentrification in hot real estate climates and against foreclosure during a 
decline.  The CLT, as a community-created, community-based entity, works for 
homeowner and community success. CLTs benefit from a national community of 
practitioners, consultants, advocates, and families. And, as Abromowitz says, the 
CLT is a superior legal instrument. 
Boston and the Future of CLTs 
The City of Boston’s housing plan suggests exploring the use of CLTs as 
part of its “Strong Healthy Neighborhoods” goal to mitigate the impacts of 
gentrification. 
In gentrifying neighborhoods, the city will work with non-profit and quasi-
governmental funding entities to help community-based organizations acquire 
land. This land will then be held for future affordable and mixed-income housing 
development. Community land trusts have been used in Boston with proven 
success. For example, for the past thirty years, the Dudley Street Neighborhood 
Initiative (DSNI) land trust has ensured that new development in the community 
serves a broad range of income levels and needs (Walsh, 2014, 94). 
This nod to CLTs can and should be developed into a robust proactive use of 
the model’s benefits. In fact, land trusts can be combined with many of the city’s 
other strategies to achieve a broader range of its housing goals, such as providing 
neighborhood stability through nonprofit acquisitions, partnering with lenders to 
reduce the number of foreclosed units they own, and reducing the number of 
problem properties. There are several hundred tax-delinquent properties where the 
city has filed a taking (Walsh, 2014, 96). If the properties remain delinquent and 
the city forecloses, all or a portion of these could be placed in a CLT and thus 
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protected into the future. The city can also take units created through its 
Inclusionary Development Program and protect their affordability in perpetuity 
through a land trust mechanism.   
In 2013, the board of DNI made a strategic decision to support Boston-area 
community organizations considering creating CLTs. Given the success of 
DSNI/DNI and its prominence in the community-building field, this entry into the 
citywide and regional arena has great potential for CLT growth and the 
preservation of local urban neighborhoods.  This move builds on strong grassroots 
organizing in Boston, including the 2006 creation of the Right to the City Alliance. 
In 2014, a number of organizations sent a letter to Mayor Martin Walsh, 
asking that the city “establish a pilot initiative to encourage and support 
neighborhoods that are interested in pursuing the community land trust model. 
They suggest that elements of this pilot initiative should include municipal support 
for organizational development, technical assistance, community engagement, land 
acquisition, and the development and stewardship of affordable housing.”  In the 
spring of 2015, a number of these groups formed the Greater Boston Community 
Land Trust Network. Among its goals is to “advocate for policy that supports the 
creation, expansion and stewardship efforts of CLTs and community-controlled 
development.” 
In Boston’s current booming development scene, the city can boldly take 
advantage of this moment to protect Boston’s future as a multi-class, multi-racial, 
and multi-ethnic innovative and equitable city by aggressively pursuing CLTs 
among its strategies. It has the evidence and the local demand and capacities to 
support such a move.  Data and practice have demonstrated the protective features 
that land trusts provide for neighborhood stability, housing affordability, and 
community building. Grassroots community activism and advocacy are calling for 
their wider use. Boston has local CLT practitioners with experience and expertise, 
including a highly regarded local trust with the capacity to support other emerging 
ones. The idea of a central server—an administrative apparatus that allows many 
community-based CLT efforts to achieve efficiencies of scale while retaining their 
grounding in their own communities—has been implemented in various localities. 
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While Boston has a unique and urgent opportunity to embrace this powerful 
model now, it also has some significant national experience and examples to draw 
from.  Since 2000, a growing number of cities and counties have turned to CLTs as 
a way to preserve housing affordability. Many jurisdictions are initiating CLTs or 
become involved as neighborhoods take the lead. Once adversarial relationships 
between municipalities and housing advocates have in many cases become 
collaborative (Davis and Jacobus, 2008).  
For instance, the city of Irvine, California, convened a housing task force to 
help develop a strategy for affordable housing. To address both production and 
preservation, the task force recommended the creation of the Irvine Community 
Land Trust (ICLT).  Any new units created with public subsidy or as a result of the 
city’s inclusionary housing ordinance could remain permanently affordable for 
future generations. The city created the Irvine CLT as an independent nonprofit 
organization in 2006. Its goal is to build 5,000 CLT units by 2025 (ICLT website).  
Municipal governments have supported CLTs in many ways. In both 
Chicago and Delray Beach, Florida, municipal governments created CLTs with 
city employees providing staffing.  In many cases, local governments have 
provided outside consultants and technical assistance to land trusts. Numerous 
municipalities have given grants to CLTs, including start-up grants, annual 
operating grants, and grants for housing production.  Sources of such funding have 
included the federal HOME Investment Partnerships program and community- 
development block grants, private foundations, and local housing trust funds. In 
addition to grants, some cities have provided interest-free loans. As was true in the 
case of Dudley, cities have donated land. In some cases, municipalities have 
waived fees and changed regulations to support land trusts. Many have 
incorporated CLTs into their inclusionary development policies, which reserve as 
affordable housing a certain percentage of new, multi-unit construction. Crucial for 
CLT homeowners, many municipalities have recognized the resale restrictions 
placed on land trust homes in calculating the assessments and property taxes on 
them. 
While still a small and relatively unknown model, the community land trust 
is gaining traction as it demonstrates its flexibility and its protectiveness through 
housing market cycles and affordability challenges. Just as governments have 
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discovered and incorporated CLTs, so have grassroots organizers, community 
residents, and advocates.  For instance, a recent email blast from Right to the City 
announced:  
Facing the largest tax foreclosure in US history, the Detroit People's 
Platform (a Right to the City member) and their allies launched a crowd source 
fundraising campaign, in ONE week, to not only buy people's homes back, but also 






Abromowitz, D. M. (2000). An Essay on Community Land Trusts: Toward Permanently 
Affordable Housing. In C. Gleiser & Gail Daneker (Eds.), Property and Value. Washington, DC: 
Island Press. 
Abromowitz, D. M., & White, K. (2006). Deed Restrictions and Community Land Trust Ground 
Leases: Two Methods of Establishing Affordable Home Ownership. In John E. Davis (Ed.), The 
Community Land Trust Reader (pp. 327–334). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy. 
Bluestone, B., Tumber, C., Lee, N., Modestino, A.S., Costello, L., & Davis, T. (2015). The 
Greater Boston Housing Report Card 2014–2015: Fixing an Out-of-Sync Housing Market. 
Prepared by the Kitty and Michael Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy, Northeastern 
University, for The Boston Foundation. 
Davis, J. E. (2010). Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States. In 
John E. Davis (Ed.), The Community Land Trust Reader (pp. 3–47). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy. 
Davis, J. E. (2006). Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-
restricted, Owner-occupied Housing. Montclair, NJ: National Housing Institute. 
Davis, J. E. (1982). An Interview with Charles Sherrod. The Community Land Trust Handbook. 
Institute for Community Economics reprinted in Davis, John E. (Ed.), The Community Land 
Trust Reader (pp. 194–201). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Davis, J. E., & Jacobus, R. (2008). The City-CLT Partnership: Municipal Support for 
Community Land Trusts. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Delinquencies and Foreclosures Remain Low in Community Land Trusts. Cambridge, MA: 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Lincoln Institute Product Code: WP11ET1. 
Dudley Neighbors Inc. Extended Period Ground Lease. Boston. 
Dudley Neighbors Inc., Dudley Neighbors Inc. 101: A Guide to Learning about the Community 
Land Trust. Boston. 
Dwyer, L. A. (2015). Mapping Impact: An Analysis of the Dudley Street Neighborhood 




Irvine Community Land Trust.  http://www.irvineclt.com/ 
29 
 
Jennings, J. (2014). DSNI Research Brief Development without Displacement: The Spatial Face 
of Potential Gentrification in Boston, Massachusetts.  
Jennings, J. (July 2013). DVC and Sub-Neighborhoods of Dudley Square, Dudley Triangle, and 
Grove Hall: Select Social, Demographic, and Economic Comparisons Based on 2010 Decennial 
Census and American Community Survey 5 Year Estimates, 2007–2011. Prepared for Dudley 
Street Neighborhood Initiative. 
Jennings, J. (with Harding, A.). (April 2013). The Dudley Village Campus: Select Social and 
Demographic Profile —2010 Decennial Census. Prepared for Dudley Street Neighborhood 
Initiative. 
Loh, P. (2015). Urban Farming, One Vacant Lot at a Time. YES! Magazine, 72, 34–39. 
Medoff, P., & Sklar, H. (1994). Streets of Hope: The Fall and Rise of an Urban Neighborhood. 
Boston: South End Press 
Miller, Y. (2014, September 9). Gentrification Seen as Gaining a Foothold in Roxbury. Bay State 
Banner. http://baystatebanner.com/news/2014/sep/10/gentrification-seen-gaining-foothold-
roxbury/?page=2; accessed 8/27/15. 
Sklar, H. (2009). No Foreclosures Here. YES! Magazine. Winter 2009. pp. 51–54 
Stone, M. E. (2006). Housing Affordability for Households of Color in Massachusetts. Institute 
for Asian American Studies Publications. Paper 11. 
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/iaas_pubs/11 
Stone, M. (2006).  Housing Affordability: One-Third of a Nation Shelter-Poor. In R. G. Bratt, M. 
E. Stone, & C. Hartman (Eds.), A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda (pp. 
38–60). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Stone, M. (2006). Social Ownership. In R. G. Bratt, M. E. Stone, & C. Hartman (Eds.), A Right 
to Housing:  Foundation for a New Social Agenda (pp. 240–260). Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Thaden, E. (2011). Stable Home Ownership in a Turbulent Economy: 
Walsh, M. J. (2014). Housing a Changing City: Boston 2030. City of Boston. 
Wyly, E. K., T. J. Cooke, D. J. Hammel, S. R. Holloway, & M. Hudson. (2000). Ten “Just-
Right” Urban Markets for Affordable Homeownership. Washington, DC: Fannie Mae 
Foundation.  
 
30 
 
 
 
